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HISTORY

If you do me a wrong, the ripple effects of that wrong may well-as
any philosopher or insurance analyst will tell you-extend almost as
far as you like. Some 180 years before the events at Hadley's Mill,
commemorated in this conference, lawyers in England had to deal
with the question of whether legal liability was equally susceptible to
this outgrowth of chaos theory. Take a case of 1674, so briefly reported that we can reproduce it in full:
The plaintiff declares, that the defendant in consideration of £10
promised to let him enjoy certain iron mills for six months; and it
appeared that the iron mills were worth but £20 per annum, and yet
damages were given to £500 by reason of the loss of stock laid in;
and per curiam the Jury may well find such damages, for they are
not bound to give only the £10 but also all the special damages.1
This result, obvious to us, clearly surprised at least someone then, or it
would not have been reported (or for that matter appealed). But it is
cases such as these-£500 damages for deprivation of a benefit worth
a mere £10-that set the scene for arguments about remoteness. Unless liability for long-tail consequential losses is to be entirely openended, some ad hoc way to limit them has to be found. There are, of
course, a number of possible means at hand. In the years before 1854,
t Bracton Professor of Law, University of Exeter, England. Presently teaches
Contracts and Commercial Law and is a member of the English Bar. Previous Lecturer in Law at the University of Cambridge and has been a visiting professor at the
University of Melbourne and University of Connecticut. Co-editor of the leading English text on Torts, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts and Author of The Law of Damages
(2003) and The Law of Restitution in England and Ireland (2001). M.A. and LL.B.
from Cambridge University.
1. Nurse v. Barnes, 83 Eng. Rep. 43 (K.B. 1674). Results like this continued to
attract comment surprisingly late. In the post-Hadley case of Mullett v. Mason, there
is this illuminating aside from Willes, J.: "There was a case in the Exchequer tried
before me at Newcastle spring assizes, 1859, in which a chemist who sold ointment to
rub sheep with was held liable to pay to their owner the whole of their value, [f2,000]
and upwards, it having killed them; although it was hard that a man who could only
make a profit of a few pence should be made responsible for so heavy a loss." Mullett
v. Mason, (1866) 1 L.R.-C.P. 559, 561.
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the courts experimented with several of them (though one would be
hard put to it to extract any clear results from this experimentation).,
Thus, the courts sometimes took refuge in fairly vague doctrines such
as causation (did the wrong really cause the damage?). 3 On other occasions, the courts regarded the matter as turning on the content of
the duty itself.4 Sometimes they simply relied on a more vague or
impressionistic test that made it clear that some remote losses could
not be claimed; however, this test was decidedly non-committal as to
the precise grounds of non-liability.5 But a test of foreseeability of
some sort eventually prevailed,6 and-as everyone knows-was finally cemented in Hadley v. Baxendale.7
Now, Hadley v. Baxendale is of course a breach of contract case,
and is today invariably taught as part of the contracts course. For a
student to mention it in, say, a torts essay is regarded by most as a
serious mistake-an error demonstrated, as any law professor will
confirm, by high authority on both sides of the Atlantic. 8 But at this
point a conundrum arises: why should this be? Why should Hadley v.
Baxendale be confined to contract, given that it aims to solve the
problem of over-extended liability for consequential losses, and that
this problem arises in tort just as much as in contract?
In looking for an answer to this problem, one thing is clear: we have
to look at events substantially after 1854. Prior to Hadley, there was
2. See A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91

LAW

Q. REV. 247, 273-77 (1975).

3. See, e.g., Boorman v. Nash, 109 Eng. Rep. 54, 56-57 (K.B. 1829) (stating damage must have necessarily resulted); Short v. Kalloway, 113 Eng. Rep. 322 (Q.B.
1839).
4. See Borrodaile v. Brunton, 129 Eng. Rep. 491, 492 (C.P. 1818) (holding that
the warrantee for breakage of an anchor cable extended to the possibility of loss of
the anchor itself).
5. See Walton v. Fothergill, 173 Eng. Rep. 174, 176 (C.P. 1835) (Tindal, C.J.) ("I
have a very strong opinion on the question of damages. I think they must be the
necessary and immediate consequence, and not so remote as those sought to be recovered."); see also 2 JAMES KENT, KENT'S COMMENTARIES 480 (4th ed. 1840)
("Damages for breaches of contract are only those which are incidental to, and directly caused by, the breach, and may reasonably be supposed to have entered into
the contemplation of the parties, and not speculative profits, or accidental and consequential losses.").
6. See, e.g., Black v. Baxendale, 154 Eng. Rep. 174, 175 (Ex. 1847) (discussing
breach of contract by a carrier, incidentally the same carrier as in Hadley); McAlpin v.
Lee, 12 Conn. 129, 133 (1837) (holding no liability for "collateral loss or damage not
naturally resulting from the breach of contract"); see also Middlekauff v. Smith, 1 Md.
329, 341-44 (1851); WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
NOT UNDER SEAL § 1022 (2d ed. 1847) ("[T]he consequential injury fairly and naturally resulting to the plaintiff from the breach will be a ground for additional compensation. But merely speculative injuries founded on uncertain future contingencies,
afford no ground for damages ....
).
7. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
8. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964); Koufos v. C.
Czarnikow, Ltd., [19671 3 All E.R. 686, 692 (H.L.). Both Kinsman and Koufos state
fairly explicitly that Hadley v. Baxendale has no part to play in tort suits.
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little, if any, sign that anyone regarded the doctrine of remoteness as
applying differently in contract and tort. If anything, the reverse was
the case: remoteness was regarded as a unitary doctrine affecting remedies as a whole. Thus, there were clear mid-nineteenth-century sug-

gestions that tort damages were constrained by a foreseeability test
fairly similar to that in Hadley. Take the 1850 English decision in
Rigby v. Hewitt,9 a completely ordinary traffic accident case, save that
the events leading to the plaintiff's injury were somewhat tortuous. 10
There, Pollock CB clearly inclined to the view that tort liability extended only to "consequences that may reasonably be expected to resuit,"" an opinion he repeated elsewhere.12 And, in case this
discussion is thought too Anglocentric, views of this sort were amply
paralleled in a number of early U.S. tort decisions. 3
Now, it is true that Hadley v. Baxendale itself was argued purely as
a contract case. It is also noteworthy that at least one of the authori-

ties the court cited-Art. 1150 of the French Civil Code"a4-referred
specifically to contractual rather than delictual liability. Nevertheless,
this is probably not a fact to be taken too seriously. Even after Hadley

v. Baxendale was decided, a respectable line of authority in England
continued to reason in a similar, general way, that all consequential
claims were subject to a single remoteness rule, whatever-their basis.
Matthews v. Discount Corp.'5 in 1869, for example, involved damages

for trover. 16 The defendant, who held receipts for jute for a lender

9. 155 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ex. 1850).
10. Id. A bus being driven too fast did not hit the plaintiff directly. Instead, a
wheel came off, hit another bus carrying the plaintiff and in turn caused that bus to
swerve into the sidewalk, injuring him.
11. Id. at 104. In the event the court declined to upset a verdict for the plaintiff.
Id.
12. See Greenland v. Chaplin, 155 Eng. Rep. 104, 106 (Ex. 1850) (addressing another traffic case).
13. See, e.g., Anonymous, 1 Minor 52 (Ala. 1821) (allowing liability for loss of
plaintiff's reputation in action for trespass by unlawful search, only because the losses
"naturally result" from the trespass); Vedder v. Hildreth, 2 Wis. 427, 429 (1853)
(wrongful taking of horse and harness from plaintiff while latter was traveling: no
liability for further loss caused when roads subsequently became impassable, since not
a loss "resulting naturally" from the taking); cf. Burnap v. Wight, 14 Ill. 300, 301
(1853) (holding that damages for non-prosecution of writ must be such as "naturally
result from the issuing of the writ").
14. "Le ddbiteur n'est tenu que des dommages et intdrts qui ont dtd prdvus ou
qu'on a pu prdvoir lors du contrat, lorsque ce n'est point par son dol que l'obligation
n'est point ex6cutde." Article 1150 of the French Civil Code corresponds to Article
1996 of the current Louisiana Civil Code, "[a]n obligor in good faith is liable only for
the damages that were foreseeable at the time the contract was made." LA. CIv.
CODE art. 1996 (West 1987).
15. [1870] 4 L.R.-C.P. 227 (1869).
16. Id. (Matthew's seems to be the first non-contract case in England raising Hadley v. Baxendale.); see also France v. Gaudet, (1872) 6 L.R.-Q.B. 199, 200 (1871) (stating that Hadley was not applicable to trover as such, but claimant cannot recover
extra damages over the value of the goods without showing defendant had knowledge
of the relevant circumstances, which comes to much the same thing).
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who had taken them as security, wrongfully parted with them to the
by-then insolvent borrower.1 7 The lender successfully recovered his
loss on what thereby had become an unsecured loan to a judgment-

proof debtor."8 The result is hardly surprising; however, what is interesting is that the Matthews decision was specifically grounded on the

basis that the loss was within the Hadley criteria. Again, in Sharp v.
Powell, 9 the defendant caused a nuisance by washing down a cart in a
public street on a freezing day.2 0 The street iced over and a passing
horse broke a leg as a result.2 " Bovill CJ denied recovery on remoteness grounds.2 2 Although Bovill did not cite Hadley, his reasoning
clearly reflected the principle contained in Hadley.2 3 Further, if a

more uncompromising statement is needed, one can find it in The
Notting Hill.2 4 Following a marine collision, owners of cargo on the

innocent ship suffered a loss of profit when, as a result, their cargo was
delivered late on a falling market.2 5

They failed on remoteness

grounds to recover this from the other vessel, Brett MR saying simply
that "[t]he rule with regard to remoteness of damage is precisely the
same whether the damages are claimed in actions of contract or of
tort, and it has been laid down many times both in Hadley v. Baxendale and other cases." 2 6 A series of similar judicial statements persisted into the early twentieth century.2 7 Nor was this a peculiarly

17. Matthews, [1870] 4 L.R.-C.P at 228-29.
18. Id at. 230-33.
19. (1872) 7 L.R.-C.P. 253.
20. Id. at 253-54.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 258
23. Id. at 253-54. "No doubt, one who commits a wrongful act is responsible for
the ordinary consequences which are likely to result therefrom; but, generally speaking, he is not liable for damage which is not the natural or ordinary consequence of
such an act, unless it be shewn that he knows, or has reasonable means of knowing,
that consequences not usually resulting from the act are, by reason of some existing
cause, likely to intervene so as to occasion damage to a third person." Id. at 258. The
parallel with Baron Alderson's formulation in Hadley is too close to be coincidental.
24. (1884) 9 P.D. 105 (C.A.).
25. Id. at 105-06.
26. Id. at 113 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the court then proceeded straightforwardly to follow precedent established in the earlier case of The Parana. See id. The
Paranawas a contract case applying Hadley v. Baxendale on fairly similar facts to The
Notting Hill, the defendant there being a carrier who delayed in breach of contract.
(1877) 2 P.D. 118 (C.A.). The Paranawas overruled as to the application of Hadley v.
Baxendale, however this fact does not affect the point in the text. See Koufos v. C.
Czarnikow, Ltd., (1967) 3 All E.R. 686 (H.L.).
27. See, e.g., H.M.S. London, [1914] P 72, 77 (1913) (Evans, President) ("It is settled law that the rule as to the remoteness of damage is the same whether the damages are claimed in actions of contract or of tort."). Lord Justice Greer in the Court
of Appeal persisted in this view into the 1930s. See Haynes v. Harwood, [1934] All
E.R. 103, 107 (C.A.); Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354, 359-60 (1934).
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English phenomenon, a line of transatlantic authorities did much the
same thing at the same time.2 8
How then, did the present orthodoxy-that a different, and more
generous, rule of remoteness applies in tort-come to be accepted? It
is true that the identification of contract and tort was never beyond
question, and that occasional early authorities did accept that Hadley
was inapplicable to tort. 29 But, the impetus for the systematic separation of tortious and contractual liability, it is suggested, arose from
two factors in particular. Both arose from certain features of the then
burgeoning tort of negligence. The first of these was the establishment of the rule that the defendant was liable for injuring a plaintiffin modern terms, owed her a duty of care-if it was even remotely
foreseeable that she might suffer damage as a result of his actions.
The second was the "thin skull" rule, whose corollary was that the
defendant was liable for the full extent of damage suffered by an unusually vulnerable plaintiff. From the 1870s, both of these were perceived to cause difficulties for courts pressed to apply Hadley in the
tort context.
Take first the duty of care. The degree of foreseeability required to
establish a duty of care has always in practice been much less than that
required under Hadley. But, if that degree of foreseeability is established, it then hardly makes sense to take away with the left hand what
has just been given by the right by saying that the loss is too remote
and therefore the plaintiff cannot recover after all. An 1871 federal
decision from California, rejecting the application of Hadley v. Baxendale in tort, demonstrated the point nicely.3 0 Bowas v. Pioneer Tow
Line, was a classic river collision case, in which a barge under tow
carelessly rammed a stern-wheeler from behind. 3 As luck would
28. For representative cases applying Hadley criteria to tort situations see Griffith
v. Burdon, 35 Iowa 138 (1872) (conversion); Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Carr, 17 A.
1052, 1054 (Md. 1889) (assault by railroad conductor); and W. Union Tel. Co. v. Short,
14 S.W. 649, 651 (Ark. 1890); and Ferrero v. W. Union Tel. Co., 9 App. D.C. 455, 464
(D.C. Cir. 1896) (negligence suits by recipients of garbled telegraphic messages, an
extraordinarily prolific source of litigation in the US in the late nineteenth century).
See too the seminal case of Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469,
475 (1876) (holding that run-on fire damage recoverable only if "ought to have been
foreseen").
29. E.g., France v. Gaudet, (1872) 6 L.R.-Q.B. 199, 200 (1871) (holding that no
analogy with Hadley could be drawn in conversion cases); see also Marsh v. Joseph,
[1897] 1 Ch. 213, 231 (C.A. 1896); Gibson v. Fischer, 25 N.W. 914 (Iowa 1885) (declining to apply Hadley to nuisance); Heister v. Loomis, 10 N.W. 60, 61 (Mich. 1881)
(declining to apply Hadley to battery); Cate v. Cate, 50 N.H. 144, 149 (1870) (declining to apply Hadley to trespass).
30. 3 F. Cas. 1024, 1028 (D. Cal. 1871) (No. 1713); see also A.F. Johnson & Son v.
Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 53 S.E. 362, 364 (N.C. 1906) (railroad liable for fire damage
even though unforeseeable under Hadley test). The result in A.F. Johnson & Son was
paralleled in an earlier England case. See Smith v. London & S.W. Ry. Co., (1872) 6

L.R.-C.P. 14 (Ex. Ch. 1870).
31. Bowas, 3 F. Cas. at 1025.
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have it, an engineer was then working on (or rather in) the wheel, and
was badly injured.3" Not surprisingly, the court said the engineer
could sue, even though it was hardly foreseeable within Hadley v.
Baxendale that he would be there at the time.33 Further the court
chose to allow the action on the simple basis that a different rule applied in tort.34

In regard to the "thin skull" rule, the potential for mismatch was
equally clear. A defendant took the vulnerable plaintiff as he found
her, even if her vulnerability was entirely unforeseeable to him. To that
extent, his liability clearly extended beyond the Hadley criteria to
damage he could never have contemplated at all. It was an English
case that seems first to have invoked this point as a reason to confine
Hadley to contract. Phillips v. London & South Western Railway
Co., in 1879 was an ordinary railroad negligence suit, the only complication being that the plaintiff who had been wrongfully disabled
was an extraordinarily (and unforeseeably) well-paid physician.36 The
Court of Appeals had no difficulty in saying that the unforeseeable
size of the income was out of account.3 7 The defendants had to take
the plaintiff as they found him.
Cases, such as those referred to above, started the movement.
From then onwards we can trace the growth of the idea that remoteness in tort is analytically different from that in contract. In England,
a unitary jurisdiction, picking up the trail is not too difficult. The case
that effectively cemented the issue was The Argentino38 in 1888. The
point was simple (and commercially vital). Could the owners of a ship
disabled in a maritime collision recover lost charter profits from the
owners of the vessel in fault? In the Court of Appeals, one judge held
they could not, on the basis that these earnings would not have been
in the defendants' contemplation under Hadley's case. But the majority held that, this being a tort suit, Hadley had no application,
and allowed the claim.3 9 After The Argentino was decided, a
steady stream of English cases4" accepted that the Hadley limitations
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1028.
34. Id. at 1028-29.
35. [1874-1880] All E.R. Rep. 1176 (C.A. 1879).
36. Id. at 1177 (indicating the plaintiff was earning something like £5,000 per annum, equivalent then to about $25,000).
37. See id. at 1181-80.
38. (1888) 13 P.D. 191 (C.A.). An appeal to the House of Lords was unsuccessful.
See The Argentino, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 519 (H.L.).
39. The Argentino, (1889) 14 A.C. 519 (H.L.).
40. E.g., Marsh v. Joseph, [1897] 1 Ch. 213, 231 (C.A. 1896); The Canadian Transport, 43 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 409, 410-11 (C.A. 1932) (Scrutton, L.J.); The Arpad,
(1934) P. 189, 200 (C.A.) (Scrutton, L.J.). In Addis v. Gramophone Co., Lord James
added a practical note stating that when he was a junior at the bar, he always pleaded
in tort rather than contract when possible precisely because of the more generous
rules of remoteness. Addis v. Gramophone Co., [1909] A.C. 488, 492 (H.L.). More
recently, an American commentator has made a similar point. See Banks McDowell,

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss2/16
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V11.I2.15

6

Tettenborn: Hadley v. COMPENSATION
Baxendale: Contract Doctrine
or Compensation Rule?
2005]
RULE

did 4not
apply in tort; a development paralleled once again in the
1
U.S.

For a time, indeed, the breach appeared absolute, because the accepted view came to be that a tort defendant's liability for consequential loss was not only outside the Hadley v. Baxendale remoteness
rule, but was unaffected by any foreseeability criterion at all.42 When

in 1961, the English courts decided that consequential damages in tort

were after all subject to a foreseeability limitation,4 3 it might have
been expected that this would presage a return to the application of
Hadley v. Baxendale in tort cases as with contract ones. But doubts
were expressed as to this some six years later, a and in 1969, Lord
Reid in the House of Lords regarded it as clear that the degrees of
foreseeability required were different, with a much laxer test applying

in tort.45 Equally, it is hard today to find much support in the U.S. for
the application of Hadley in tort.

6

Foreseeabilityin Contract and Tort: The Problems of Responsibility and Remoteness,

36

CASE

W. RES. L.

REV.

286, 287-88 (1986).

41. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, 70 S.E. 65, 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911) (refusing to apply Hadley limitations to negligent failure to deliver telegram case); W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Biggerstaff, 97 N.E. 531, 533 (Ind. 1912) (refusing to apply Hadley
limitations to tortious telegram loss); McCurdy v. Wallblom Furniture & Carpet Co.,
102 N.W. 873, 875 (Minn. 1905) (declining to apply Hadley limitation in case of conversion); Hudson v. AtI. Coast Line R.R. Co., 55 S.E. 103, 105 (N.C. 1906) (fire damage suit against railroad for emitting sparks); A.F. Johnson & Son v. Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co., 53 S.E. 362 (N.C. 1906) (fire damage suit against railroad for emitting
sparks); Garland v. Carolina, Clinchfield, & Ohio Ry., 90 S.E. 779, 779 (N.C. 1916)
(declining to apply Hadley limitation to damages suit in tort against railroad by passenger carried beyond her stop).
42. See In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 577 (C.A.) (stating what has become
known as the "Polemis rule"); see also Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 52 N.E. 747, 748
(Mass. 1899); Christianson v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 69 N.W.
640, 641 (Minn. 1896).
43. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (The Wagon
Mound), (1961) 1 A.C. 388 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Sup. Ct. of N.S.W., AustI.).
Strictly speaking this was a Privy Council decision on appeal from Australia, but no
one doubted then or subsequently that the decision represented English law as well.
44. Lord Reid suggested that, as regards remoteness, "[t]here has in recent times
been much development of the law of torts, and developments in the law of contract
may not have proceeded on parallel lines." Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller
S.S. Co. (The Wagon Mound (No. 2)), [1967] 1 A.C. 617, 638 (P.C. 1966) (appeal
taken from Sup. Ct. of N.S.W., Austi.).
45. See Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd., (1967) 3 All E.R. 686 (H:L.) (a case wellknown to students on both sides of the Atlantic for its varied exegeses of the degree
of foreseeability required under Hadley); see also Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates
Ltd., [1995] 2 A.C. 145, 185 (H.L. 1994) (restating this orthodoxy in a passing
reference).
46. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[T~he rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale has no place in negligence law." (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)); see also Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp., 50 P.3d 866, 871 (Colo. 2002); Kuehl
v. Freeman Bros. Agency, 521 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Iowa 1994).
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SKEPTICISM

So far so good. As far as most commentators are concerned,
whatever the position may have been at an earlier time, the position
today is clear, and Hadley is confined to contract.
Or is it? Despite the prevailing orthodoxy, I must confess to some
skepticism here. This is for three reasons: first, the orthodox position
is more often asserted than argued for, and when one looks more
closely at the arguments in support of it, it becomes increasingly clear
that they do not hold up. Secondly, there are powerful arguments the
other way, i.e., in favour of regarding the Hadley rule as a general
principle of compensation law, without reference to the type of suit
involved. Thirdly, it is arguable that if one looks at what courts do
rather than what they say, the tendency-at least in England-has
been to apply Hadley-style criteria to consequential claims in tort as
much as in contract.
A.

Arguments for Limiting Hadley to Contract

Although the point is not often discussed as a matter of principle, it
is suggested that the arguments in favour of limiting Hadley to contract essentially amount to four. I will deal with each in turn.
The first two relate to points already mentioned above. Let us begin with the argument that Hadley cannot logically be applicable to
the tort of negligence, because the degree of foreseeability of harm
necessary to create that liability is admittedly a great deal lower than
that required under Hadley. This contention probably lies at the bottom of most of the statements that the rule of remoteness is more
generous in tort than contract, but, with respect, it is not very convincing. For one thing, analytically the argument can only apply at all to
some torts: namely, negligence and analogous causes of action (such
as nuisance, strict liability for extra-hazardous acts, etc.) in which the
duty problem arises in the same way as in negligence-that is, where a
foreseeable plaintiff is a prerequisite of liability.4 7 To others, such as
trespass or conversion, where the incidence of liability is clear and the
only issue is its extent, it is simply irrelevant. More importantly, however, even if we limit our consideration to negligence and similar torts,
it has to be noted that the lax foreseeability requirement there, was
developed in connection with questions of the creation of liability 4 8that is, to the question whether the defendant owed a duty of care to
the plaintiff at all. But, as we pointed out at the beginning of this
47. See The Wagon Mound (No. 2), [1967] 1 A.C. at 617 (nuisance); Cambridge
Water Co. v. E. Counties Leather PLC, [1994] 1 A.C. 264 (H.L. 1993) (Rylands v.
Fletcher type liability).
48. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also The Wagon
Mound, [1961] 1 A.C. at 388; The Wagon Mound (No. 2), [1967] 1 A.C. at 617. All
these cases involved questions of whether the defendant was liable to this plaintiff at
all, not issues of consequential loss.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss2/16
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V11.I2.15

8

Tettenborn: Hadley v. Baxendale:
Contract Doctrine
or Compensation Rule?
COMPENSATION
RULE
2005]

paper, remoteness issues are important almost exclusively in regards
to heads of consequential or "run-off" damage; the defendant's liability to pay for direct loss or damage is normally beyond question.4 9 In
other words, it is important here to draw a distinction between immediate and consequential loss. While it is clear Hadley cannot apply to
a plaintiff's claim to recover in negligence for her immediate damage,
this is no reason at all why it should not apply to the quantification of
her recovery for consequential loss.
The second argument is the "thin skull" point. Namely, that a defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds her, without reference to the
foreseeability or otherwise of her condition. This can, it is suggested,
be dealt with fairly summarily. There is simply nothing inconsistent
between it and a general rule requiring foreseeability of a given head
of loss. It is entirely coherent to say that the plaintiff's right to recover
a particular category of loss or damage depends on whether loss of
that sort was foreseeable, but that once the plaintiff surmounts that
hurdle, then she recovers in full for all her losses under the head concerned. Indeed, this has been held to be the case in the law of contract itself, where the "thin skull" rule, as regards a particular category
of damage, coexists perfectly happily with the general applicability of
Hadley v. Baxendale in deciding whether there can be recovery under
that head in the first place.5 °
The third argument is perhaps the most formidable, at least at first
sight. It runs as follows: for all their apparent similarity, when properly analysed, the issues of remoteness in contract and tort are simply
not the same. In tort, remoteness rules serve an essentially social, fairness, or balancing function. In so far as we limit a tort defendant's
liability for long-tail losses, we do it to avoid unfairness to him, to
allow a degree of insurability, and to apply at least a degree of proportionality between wrong and loss. 5 1 In contract, by contrast, the matter is essentially about choice. Just as the law of contract allows a
person to decide what obligations he wishes to undertake in the first
place, the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale is at bottom about allowing him
to determine what losses he will agree to cover should he break them
49. But see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 60-61 (3d ed.
2002) (arguing that basic contractual damages, such as the price-value differential, are
in effect conclusively deemed foreseeable).
50. See Vacwell Eng'g Co. v. B.D.H. Chems. Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 88 (C.A. 1969)
(finding liability for catastrophic explosion even though only minor one foreseeable);
H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 All E.R. 525, 534 (C.A.
1977) (declaring liability for death of hogs even though only slight illness foreseeable).
The U.S. position very similar to the English position. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.14 (2d ed. 1990). For a spirited attack on the U.S. position,
see Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 41 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 1425, 1480-94 (2003).
51. E.g., Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, ConsequentialDamagesfor Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 665,
674-77 (1994).
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(or, more abstractly but perhaps more accurately, what uncertain risks
associated with a possible breach he is prepared to underwrite).
Hence the facts, among other things, that foreseeability is reckoned at
the time of contracting (since this is a contractor's last chance to

change his mind), and that what is required for liability under the second head is not simply knowledge of potential losses, but some indica-

tion of a common intent52 that the contract-breaker is content to bear
responsibility for them.
This is a powerful argument, especially among law and economics
scholars who emphasise the peculiar facility available to contractors to
adjust the incidence of potential risks by agreement among them-

selves.53 Nevertheless, it is suggested that ultimately it does not hold
water, for three main reasons.

To begin with, despite some early suggestions to the contrary,5 4 the
fact that contractual liabilities are fluid and open to adjustment by the

parties does not mean that in contract a person is liable only for such
losses as he has expressly or impliedly agreed to bear. On the con-

trary, in so far as the parties do not agree on where a given risk should
lie, it now seems accepted that Hadley v. Baxendale is a genuine limiting device aimed at providing a default rule that will violate as few
expectations as possible and provide the optimum balance between
plaintiff and defendant.55 Now, if this is right, it becomes apparent

that in fact the contract remoteness rule, at least in its default form,
serves much the same function as the tort one.56 The most plausible
position to adopt is one where the defendant is liable only in respect
of those risks within his knowledge and control-which is effectively
what Hadley v. Baxendale says.
52. See Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903).
53. More precisely, the prevailing view is that Hadley v. Baxendale provides incentives for disclosure of information so as to allow the parties to arrive at an efficient
bargain as to the losses for which each will be liable. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.10 (3d ed. 1986).
54. E.g., Globe Ref Co., 190 U.S. at 544 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (stating that recovery
"depends on what liability the defendant fairly may be supposed to have assumed
consciously, or to have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed,
when the contract was made").
55. English and U.S. authority now seem agreed on this principle. See, e.g.,
FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, § 12.14; U.C.C. § 2-715, cmt. 2 (2004); Koufos v. C.
Czarnikow, Ltd., [1967] 3 All E.R. 686 (H.L.) (Lord Upjohn); GKN Centrax Gears
Ltd. v. Matbro Ltd., [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 555, 574, 580 (C.A.). But see Kramer, An
Agreement-Centred Approach to Remoteness and ContractDamages, in MCKENDRICK
& COHEN, COMPARATIVE REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT (Hart

Publishing,

2004) (arguing for the resurrection of the agreement theory).
56. See Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REv. 457, 468 (1994) ("In contract law, the doctrine of
consequential damages has served as a limit on the potential liability of the defendant;
the same basic purpose that proximate cause has served in tort cases."). This is, of
course, particularly true since the acceptance that tort damages are themselves often
subject to a remoteness rule based on foreseeability.
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Secondly, the distinction between imposed liability (tort) and accepted liability (contract) is less clear-cut than it seems. The standard
text-book examples-on the one hand, a motorist at risk of liability
who is rationally disinclined to spend resources on non-cost-effective
precautions, and on the other, the seller of disembodied widgets contemplating a deal with a third party who offers more for them-are, to
say the least, somewhat specialized. If one looks at, say, a professional defendant facing potential tort liability for malpractice, or a
supplier of defective components facing a suit arising out of the
buyer's business disruption, we may be closer to the kind of case most
lawyers come across; and here the differences are much less. Just as in
contract, the requirement of knowledge arises from our wish to give a
potential defendant a chance to take stock and think before committing himself, so the same can be said of many torts. Before putting
himself into the position of a potential tortfeasor, a person-for example, the professional just mentioned-has the right to assume that he
is not facing risks of which he has no reason to be aware.5 7 Again, the
issues arising out of a supply of defective goods which dislocate the
plaintiff's business are not dissimilar to those engendered by, say,
damage to those selfsame goods in the plaintiff's hands.
Thirdly, it must be remembered that many cases of tort do in fact
arise from a choice by a defendant to accept responsibility for a given
risk. Virtually all negligent misstatements are a case in point, as are
tortious liabilities arising out of professional engagements such as
those of attorneys or accountants. And here, where tort is in any case
much more similar to contract than most lawyers would care to admit,
the reasoning applicable to contract is applicable just as much to tortious liability.
A final argument in favor of excluding Hadley v. Baxendale from
tort suits arises from the important point that the incidents of various
torts differ more than those of breaches of contract. Whereas all
breaches of contract can with some plausibility be lumped together
and treated similarly for remoteness purposes-the defendant promised to do something and then did not do it-the same does not go for
all torts.58 In particular, there is little doubt that while torts involving
inadvertent wrongdoing, such as negligence, nuisance, or strict prod57. See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The
amount of care that a person ought to take is a function of the probability and magnitude of the harm that may occur if he does not take care. If he does not know what
that probability and magnitude are, he cannot determine how much care to take."
(citation omitted)).
58. For example, Anglo-American law does not generally differentiate for remoteness purposes between deliberate and inadvertent breaches of contract. Interestingly
enough, other systems do make such a distinction. Compare PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 9.503 (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000), with LA. CIv.
CODE art. 1996 (West 1987) ("An obligor in good faith is liable only for the damages
that were foreseeable at the time the contract was made." (emphasis added)). Perhaps surprisingly, there exists California authority which similarly differentiates be-
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ucts liability, are subject to foreseeability limitations on recovery of
consequential losses, the same does not necessarily go for torts involving dishonesty, such as deceit. Here, at least under the prevailing rule
in England,5 9 the defendant is liable for all losses directly resulting,
whether or not those losses were foreseeable at all. It follows that
even if the Hadley v. Baxendale limitations were held applicable on
principle to tort suits, they would not necessarily be appropriate to all
torts.
Now, this is clearly true. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that this is
not a reason arbitrarily to limit Hadley to contract cases. Far from it,
it merely means that, if Hadley is applicable to wrongs generally, certain types of wrong will have to be excepted. It is perfectly possible,
in other words, to have a principle along the following lines: in wrongs
generally, a wrongdoer is not liable for a loss that he could not have
foreseen in the light of the information available to him, but that (if it
is felt that fraudulent defendants should be treated differently) this
will not apply to where it is shown that he has been guilty of deliberate or fraudulent wrongdoing.
B.

Arguments in Favor of a Common Standard
So far I have argued that the arguments in favour of the orthodox
"contract-only" view do not hold water. More importantly, however,
it is suggested that the arguments against them, and in favour of a
common standard, are even stronger. Two in particular standout.
The first concerns the phenomenon of concurrent liability in contract and tort. It must be remembered that there is nothing necessarily
unusual about a person facing parallel liability in both contract and
tort on the same facts. In a few situations this has always been the
case: carriers, warehousemen, and other bailees for reward, negligently damaging goods come to mind. Similarly, a commercial buyer
of dangerous goods may have parallel causes of action under the
merchantability provisions of sales law' and also on the basis of negligent failure by the seller to warn, or for that matter ordinary negligence law.6 1 But, rather more importantly, in recent years the same
tween deliberate and inadvertent breaches of contract. See Overstreet v. Merritt, 200
P. 11, 14-17 (Cal. 1921).
59. See, e.g., Smith New Court Sec. Ltd. v. Citibank N.A., [1997] 1 A.C. 254,
264-67, 281 (H.L. 1986). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 548A (1965)
(stating that in order for losses to be recoverable they must be "reasonably expected
to result for reliance"); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 767 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (stating that consequential damages must be established
with reasonable certainty).
60. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2004); Sale of Goods Act 1979 § 14 (Eng.). In the English
Sale of Goods Act, the obligation is now re-christened "satisfactory quality" for the
supposed benefit of the unsophisticated, but it means much the same thing.
61. See, e.g., Vacwell Eng'g Co. v. B.D.H. Chems. Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 88 (C.A.
1969) (dangerous chemical supplied by defendant to plaintiff explodes, demolishing
plaintiff's premises: seller liable under both heads).
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phenomenon has begun to spread elsewhere in the law. In particular,
a client suing for professional malpractice may well be able to rely
either on the tort of negligence or on breach of an implied contractual
duty to take care-a development that has been most marked in England,62 but which also applies, albeit in more limited circumstances,
in the U.S.6 3 Indeed, even the non-client beneficiary may be in the
same position, depending on the generosity of the jurisdiction concerned, as regards third-party contractual rights.6 4 Now, if the orthodox theory of Hadley is right-i.e., that consequential losses are
treated in a markedly different way in contract and tort-it must follow that in any case of concurrent liability there are not one but two
measures of loss: the contractual and the tortious. Such a development would be, to say the least odd, not to mention highly unfortu65
nate. In fact there is little sign of such a development in practice.
Professional malpractice-a case, incidentally, where the availability
of recovery for consequential loss and damage can be one of the most
important issues-is routinely regarded as one topic, not two separate
ones, divided according to whether liability happens to be on a contractual or on a tort theory. It follows that there should be one measure of damages for professional malpractice, and not separate
measures for its contractual and tortious varieties. Other similar situ62. See Midland Bank Trust Co. v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp, [1979] Ch. 384 (1977)
(establishing the precedent for lawyer malpractice). However, since the decision of
the House of Lords in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., [1995] 2 A.C. 145 (H.L.
1994), virtually all professionals have been subject to concurrent liability in tort,
whether plaintiff's loss be physical or economic. Henderson itself concerned the liability of a slightly recondite type of professional, namely a Lloyd's underwriting agent.
Id.
63. E.g., Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co.,
636 N.E.2d 503, 514-15 (Ill. 1994) (bringing malpractice claim against accountant in
both tort and contract); Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (Ill. 1992) (bringing
malpractice claim against lawyer in both tort and contract). Attempts to extend liability to other professionals have been less rewarding. E.g., Nielsen v. United Serv.
Auto. Ass'n, 612 N.E.2d 526, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (denying malpractice claim
against direct-sell insurer); Rothberg v. Reichelt, 705 N.Y.S.2d 115, 118 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) (denying malpractice claim against architect). However, some attempts to
expand professional liability beyond mere accountants and lawyers have succeeded.
See, e.g., Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 983-84 (Fla. 1999) (holding engineer
liable for negligent pre-purchase inspection of home); Beachwalk Villas Condo Ass'n,
Inc v. Martin, 406 S.E.2d 372, 373-74 (S.C. 1991) (holding architect liable in both tort
and contract).
64. See Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Or. 1987) (holding, in respect of negligent preparation of a will, that. an attorney liable to would-be legatee alternatively in
tort because the would-be legatee was a third party beneficiary of the attorney's contract with the testator).
65. See the English decisions in Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v. Eagle Star Ins.
Co., [19951 2 All E.R. 769 (C.A.) and Birmingham Midshires Building Society v. Phillips [1998] P.N.L.R. 468; and compare the old New York case of Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio
Corp., 157 N.E. 140, 142-43 (N.Y. 1927) (holding Hadley rule applies even if concurrent liability in contract and tort). Note, however, that in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C. 145, 185, Lord Goff seemingly accepted, in an obiter aside,
that concurrent liability might indeed lead to differential measures.
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ations should follow the same rule. The seller of goods, it is suggested,
should face the same liability for consequential loss to the buyerdamage done to her other property, business losses, etc.-whether he
is sued under the contract of sale, for negligence, for careless failure to
warn, or even on a product liability theory.
Secondly, even where there is no concurrency of liability, it has to
be remembered that what is in effect exactly the same damage may
fail to be compensated on different theories-contract or tort-fairly
arbitrarily according to the facts of the case and the position of plaintiff and or defendant. A prime example is personal injury, which is
just as plausibly a matter of contract as of torts; for example, a buyer
injured by a defective product will sue the seller under sales law, but
the manufacturer under a more or less strict tort theory. But there
exist any number of other instances as well. If we assume a relatively
narrow scope for contractual recovery by third parties, then cases of
legal, accountancy, or valuation malpractice will give rise to liabilities
that are contractual or non-contractual according to whether or not
the plaintiff who is suing happened to be a client of the defendant.
Similarly, damage to goods caused by the fault of a carrier or bailee
will be compensable in contract where the claimant was in a direct
relationship with the defendant, but in tort otherwise. Again, suppose
goods in transit are destroyed in a collision caused by the combined
negligence of the driver of the truck carrying them and that of another
driver. If the owner sues the carrying trucker, she recovers in contract: if she sues the non-carrying trucker, she succeeds in tort alone.
And so on. Now, in cases such as these exactly the same comment
applies as with concurrent liability. Although the traditional view of
Hadley demands a different approach to recovery of consequential
losses depending on whether the plaintiff succeeds under a contract or
a tort theory, as often as not there is no sensible reason why courts
should differentiate the measure of recovery on this basis. The equities are very often the same, questions of the measure of recovery for
damage to goods (whether consequential losses can include loss of lucrative market) or legal malpractice (can a plaintiff sue for loss of business reputation or other indirect losses) ought to be answered the
same way whatever the theory on which liability is predicated.
The third point in favor of a common standard can be simply stated.
Where the point actually matters there is not much indication that
courts do in fact apply the strict division between remoteness in contract and tort that prevails in theory. This has been particularly noticeable in England, where the virtual absence of the civil jury means
that judges have had to articulate issues of remoteness of damage with
some precision. Take, for example, an instructive 1978 product liability case where defendants sold a badly-ventilated feed hopper to a hog
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farm.6 6 Nuts stored in it went moldy as a result, and the farmer's hogs
sickened and died after eating them.67 The main issue was whether
this consequence was too remote (it was decided that it was not). In
fact, the defendants were sued under sales law. Nevertheless, interestingly enough all three members of the Court of Appeals agreed, with
an admirable degree of common sense, that it should make no difference to the question of remoteness whether the defendants were liable in contract or tort (though it must be admitted that their reasoning
on the matter was somewhat unsatisfactory).6 8 Since then, in two
straightforward tort decisions defendants liable for negligent damage
to a house have been exonerated for, in one case, further damage
caused by an influx of squatters while the home was empty69 and, in
the other, consequential theft of the homeowner's belongings. 70 The
ground in both decisions was that these losses were too remote; and
although in neither case are the judgments a model of clarity, it is
clear that in both cases the degree of foreseeability required by the
court was a good deal more than would normally be required under
the law of negligence, and that in practice, a test indistinguishable
from Hadley was being applied. 7 1 Again, in a series of professional
malpractice cases (which in England today are invariably brought in
contract and tort in the alternative) the courts have pretty consistently
applied Hadley v. Baxendale criteria to questions whether particular
heads of consequential loss are too remote. 72 Additionally, there exist
other examples of the same phenomenon.73
66. H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [19781 1 All E.R. 525
(C.A. 1977).
67. Id. at 525.
68. Id. at 534. The majority in the three-judge court solemnly said that the difference in the degree of foreseeability under Hadley and that required to create liability
in negligence was semantic and not real. See id. at 541. This statement, with respect,
is palpably false. Lord Denning M.R. took a different line. He would have applied
Hadley to economic loss and the more generous negligence standard to other damage.
Id. at 534. Interestingly, Lord Denning's application of Hadley reflects the position in
sales contracts governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)
(2004). However, it is difficult on principle to see why the distinction should be drawn
at all.
69. Lamb v. London Borough of Camden, [1981] 2 All E.R. 408 (C.A.).
70. Ward v. Cannock Chase Dist. Council, [1986] 1 Ch. 546, 550 (1985).
71. See Lamb, [1981] 2 All E.R. at 417, 419, 421; Ward, [1986] 1 Ch. at 551.
72. See e.g., Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., [1995] 2 All
E.R. 769, 841 (C.A.) (regarding valuers' liability, Lord Bingham refers to test of remoteness applicable to breach of contract or tort without differentiation); Birmingham Midshires Bldg. Soc'y v. Phillips [1998] P.N.L.R. 468. For another possible
example see Brown v. KMR Servs. Ltd., [1994] 4 All E.R. 385, 400 (Q.B.) (holding
Lloyd's agent liable in both contract and tort).
73. For instance, in the tort of conversion the English courts have recently confirmed that where the conversion is innocent liability is limited to damage foreseeable
on effectively the same basis as Hadley v. Baxendale-i.e., to losses generally foreseeable, or losses of which the defendant was on notice. See, e.g., Kuwait Airways Corp.
v. Iraqi Airways Co., [2002] 2 A.C. 883, 1097-98 (H.L).
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In the U.S., matters are, as usual, less straightforward.7 4 Apart from
anything else, it is as often as not that a jury be given an issue whether
a given head of consequential loss is foreseeable enough to be recoverable, and with juries merely instructed to find whether that head
was foreseeable to the defendant, or presented with some other
equally unfocused question, it is normally not clear which foreseeability test-the contractual or the tortious-is being applied.75 Nevertheless, it is possible to occasionally find examples of the same process
that goes on in England. One notable case in the Seventh Circuit can
76
provide the flavor. In Evra Corporationv. Swiss Bank Corporation,
a bank was sued in tort for failing to make a payment on time, with
the result that the plaintiff lost the benefit of a very profitable ship
charter.7 7 Having discussed Hadley at length, Justice Posner said that
even though the case was brought on a tort theory of recovery, there
was essentially no difference between it and a contract action. Given
the bank's lack of knowledge of the plaintiff's situation, it made no
sense within the Hadley criteria to make it compensate the plaintiff
for its loss, and the judge duly decided accordingly.
III.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that historically the 'reasonable foreseeability'
criterion in Hadley v. Baxendale was thought of as a fairly general
damages limitation exercise whose chief function was to prevent liability for consequential loss getting out of control, and that it was only
somewhat later that lawyers got the idea that there should be a fundamental cleavage between tort and contract. The aim of this article has
been to show that, despite what has since become modern orthodoxy,
the arguments against applying Hadley to non-contractual claims do
not stand up. The way should therefore be open to regard Hadley as
what it was always intended to be: a general rule applying to all forms
of compensation for non-deliberate damage, whatever the formal
source of the defendant's liability.7 8 Whether courts will explicitly accept my common sense proposition remains, of course, to be seen.
74. In Louisiana there has been an explicit melding of contract and tort. See, e.g.,
Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (La. 1988). But this is a civil law
jurisdiction, and the basis was the incorporation by analogy into delict of section 1996
of the Louisiana Civil Code, which on its wording deals only with contracts, because
there seemed no codal provision directly applicable. Id.
75. E.g., McDowell, supra note 40, at 295.
76. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 955-60.
78. So as not to make this Essay too long, I have not dealt with other forms of
liability for wrongs, such as breach of trust. The traditional view in England is still
that common law rules of remoteness, and hence Hadley v. Baxendale, do not apply to
breach of trust actions. See, e.g., Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns, [1996] 1 A.C. 421,
434, 438-39 (H.L. 1995). On the arguments I have advanced, this raises the same
difficulties as the blanket exclusion of Hadley v. Baxendale from tort suits. Indeed,
there is some sign that times may be changing, at least with regard to suits against
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